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Andrew E Jillson ***
Donald A Rector****
HE 1982 survey period saw reduced judicial activity in the area of
creditor and consumer rights. The survey period likewise passed
without any legislative activity in these areas. The greatest amount
of judicial activity during the survey period occurred in connection with
the scope and applicability of the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act (DTPA)1 and the Texas Consumer Credit Code.2
I. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
No legislative amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act occurred during the survey period. A significant
degree of judicial activity took place, however, involving interpretations of
various DTPA provisions as outlined below.
A. A Deceptive Act
A number of cases examined the various items on the "laundry list" of
deceptive acts,3 the requirement that such act be a producing cause of the
damage, 4 and the requirement that the damaged party establish the pres-
* B.A., Duke University; M.B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Southern
Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas,
Texas.
*** B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; J.D., College of William
and Mary. Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas, Texas.
**** B.B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas,
Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
2. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp. 1971-1982).
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
4. Id. § 17.50(a) provides:
A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a
producing cause of actual damages:
(1) the use or employment by any person of a false, misleadin$, or deceptive
act or practice that is specifically enumerated in a subdivision of Subsec-
tion (b) of Section 17.46 of this subchapter,
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty;
(3) any unconscionable action or course of action by any person; or
(4) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of
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ence of an act on the statutory list before liability ensues. 5 In Fortner v.
Fannin Bank 6 a loan customer brought an action under the DTPA forthe
alleged failure of the defendant lender to file title papers on the plaintiff's
automobile. In reversing a summary judgment in favor of the lender, the
appellate court determined that an act not listed on the statutory deceptive
laundry list may still violate the DTPA. 7 To overcome the omission, the
plaintiff must prove that the act or practice in fact occurred and that the
act or practice was in fact deceptive.8 The Austin court of appeals held
that an act is deceptive if it has the capacity to deceive an ignorant, un-
thinking, or credulous person.9
The Dallas court of appeals ruled in Trenholm v. RatclfP° that to be
actionable a representation must be relied upon by the aggrieved party."
The plaintiff, a home builder, continued to purchase and construct houses
on subdivision lots after learning that the representations of the defendant
developer's representative were false. The court found such conduct to be
conclusive proof that the plaintiff had not relied on the defendant's state-
ments and therefore had not been harmed by the false statements.' 2 The
Texas Supreme Court agreed that reliance is a necessary element, but re-
versed the finding at the trial level that reliance had been proven as a mat-
ter of law.' 3
In Bormaster v. Henderson ' 4 the plaintiff brought suit under the DTPA
for breach of express and implied warranties arising from the purchase of
a pet cockatoo that died three weeks after the purchase. The Houston
[14th District] court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision denying
relief to the plaintiff because his evidence failed to establish sufficiently
that the cause of the disease and subsequent death of his pet cockatoo was
the fault of the defendant pet shop owner. 15 The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant misrepresented the quality of the cockatoo at the time of
purchase by certifying that the bird was healthy when in fact it was dis-
eased. To be actionable under the DTPA, the act complained of must be
Article 21.21, Texas Insurance Code, as amended, or rules or regulations
issued by the State Board of Insurance under Article 21.21, Texas Insur-
ance Code, as amended.
See also Butler v. Joseph's Wine Shop, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 926, 931 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.) (discussion of special issue submission on § 17.50(a) of
DTPA).
5. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
6. 634 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
7. Id. at 77.
8. Id.; see also Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. 1978) (source of two-
pronged test to find an act not on laundry list violative of DTPA); Cravens v. Skinner, 626
S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (confirming test).
9. 634 S.W.2d at 78; see Chrysler-Plymouth City, Inc. v. Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700,
705 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
10. 636 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982), reversed, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 239, 241
(Feb. 26, 1983).
11. 636 S.W.2d at 720.
12. Id.
13. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 239, 241 (Feb. 26, 1983).
14. 624 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
15. Id. at 658-59.
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the producing cause of the damage.' 6 Because the plaintiff failed to show
the cause of the bird's death by a preponderance of the evidence, he did
not establish the existence of a defective condition at the time of sale that
was a producing cause of the disease and death.' 7
A disturbing case decided by a Houston [1st District] court of civil ap-
peals found DTPA liability to arise from facts more properly depicting a
wrongful foreclosure. In Dickinson State Bank v. Ogden 18 the defendant
bank had been assigned a mechanic's lien contract that obligated the land-
owners to pay the contractor within 120 days from the date of execution,
subject to the contractor's completion of the contract. The contract pro-
vided that if the project was not completed, the bank would have a lien for
the contract price less the cost necessary to complete the project. The bank
foreclosed on this lien when the landowners failed to pay within 120 days,
but before the project was completed. The court of appeals found that the
bank's attempt to foreclose was a representation that the contract con-
ferred rights and remedies not actually granted. 19 Such action was held by
the court to be a false, misleading, or deceptive act under the DTPA.20
In Sam Montgomery Oldsmobile Co. v. Johnson21 the Houston [1st Dis-
trict] court of appeals ruled that the practice of "cannibalization" is a de-
ceptive act that is actionable under the DTPA.22 When the defendant auto
dealer failed to replace cannibalized parts with factory replacements
matching original specifications, it violated section 17.46(a) of the
DTPA.23 The court indicated that temporarily borrowing parts from one
vehicle, if they are later replaced with identical factory parts, would proba-
bly not be actionable under the DTPA.24
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and remanded the decision of the
Dallas court of civil appeals in Robinson v. Preston Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.25 The supreme court stated that the DTPA does not impose liability
for the failure to disclose facts the speaker does not know. 26 The plaintiff
contended that a seller commits a deceptive act by the failure to disclose
material facts to a buyer even if the seller has no knowledge of those facts.
The case arose prior to the 1979 amendments to the DTPA making "fail-
16. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
17. 624 S.W.2d at 660; see also Riojas v. Lone Star Gas Co., 637 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (producing cause, defined as efficient, exciting
or contributing cause, is equally applicable under pre- and post-1979 versions of the DTPA).
18. 624 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1981), rev'don other grounds,
26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 200 (Jan. 26, 1983). The supreme court specifically acknowledged that
the bank's statement was a deceptive act under DTPA section 17.46(b)(12). 26 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. at 204.
19. 624 S.W.2d at 220.
20. Id. at 219-20.
21. 624 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
22. Id. at 240. Cannibalization is automobile dealers' practice of switching parts from
one car to another on the lot. id.
23. Id.; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) prohibits
"false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices."
24. 624 S.W.2d at 240.
25. 633 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. 1982).
26. Id. at 502.
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ure to disclose material facts" a laundry list violation. Consequently, the
actions complained of had to be shown to be "[flalse, misleading or decep-
tive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" 27 to be
actionable. 28 The supreme court held that a failure to disclose material
facts not known is not a false, misleading, or deceptive act.29
B. Definition ofConsumer
In order to be entitled to the rights and protections the DTPA affords, a
plaintiff must be a consumer. The DTPA defines a consumer as "an indi-
vidual who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or serv-
ices." 30 During the survey period Texas courts grappled with the task of
determining whether a defendant's activities constituted the provision of
goods or services.
In Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc. 31 the defendant sold distributor-
ships in certain geographical territories in Texas granting the buyer the
right to solicit and sell new and used car dealers a program designed to
improve customer relations. The defendant advertised a "Firm Buy Back
Agreement" and that the buyer's investment was "Completely Secured."
The plaintiff claimed the advertisements violated section 17.46(b)(12) of
the laundry list.32 Because this case arose prior to the 1979 amendments,
the services provided had to be "for other than business or commercial
use" before the user of such service could be a consumer. 33 The Tyler
court of appeals held, therefore, that the plaintiff was not a consumer as to
the. services the defendant provided.34 In a hybrid situation, involving the
purchase of both goods and services, the court determined that the plaintiff
has the burden to differentiate between the goods and services for which he
can recover as a consumer.
35
The purchaser in Guerra v. Brumlow36 claimed he was wronged by the
misrepresentation of the seller-defendant that a bull purchased was a good
breeder. The seller-defendant was an officer in an association sponsoring
the sale, but owned no interest in the bull. The seller did, however, work
closely with the owner and was a joint payee on the promissory note pay-
able by the purchaser. Despite the fact the seller-defendant never had an
ownership interest in the bull, the San Antonio court of appeals found the
27. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
28. 633 S.W.2d at 502.
29. Id.
30. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) ("representing
that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have
or involve, or which are prohibited by law").
31. 625 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981), rev'd and rendered, 631 S.W.2d 726
(Tex. 1982). The supreme court reversed and rendered the appellate court's decision on
plaintiff's alternative pleading for fraud.
32. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
33. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 323.
34. 625 S.W.2d at 396-97.
35. Id. at 397.
36. 630 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
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plaintiff to be a consumer and held the defendant liable. 37
In Tom Benson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Alvarado38 the San Antonio court of
appeals decided that the plaintiff was a consumer because part of the
plaintiff's inducement in purchasing the car was the repair services war-
ranty the defendants provided.3 9 The defendant argued that the plaintiff
failed to prove she was a consumer of services or service warranties fur-
nished by the defendant. The evidence, however, showed that the plaintiff
obtained her warranty from General Motors Corporation (GMC) and re-
ceived the warranty work from the defendant pursuant to its dealership
agreement with GMC, whereupon GMC paid the defendant for its work.
The Austin court of appeals in Fortner v. Fannin Bank 40 discussed the
issue of whether a bank's financial services constitute services under the
DTPA so as to qualify a borrower as a consumer. While recognizing that
the Texas Supreme Court has held that the borrowing of money is not an
acquisition of services under the DTPA,4 1 the court of appeals properly
noted that the supreme court expressly refused to determine whether activ-
ities collateral to a loan transaction are subject to the DTPA. 42 The collat-
eral activity examined by the court in Fortner was the bank's alleged
agreement to process the title papers on the plaintiffs car. Using the defi-
nition of services promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court in Van Zandt
v. Fort Worth Press 4 3 the court determined that the bank's alleged agree-
ment with Fortner "assisted or benefited" Fortner or "was an activity on
his behalf," and thus was a service enabling Fortner to be treated as a
consumer with rights to bring an action under the DTPA."4
C Damages
Many cases were decided during the survey period in which courts dealt
with the proper measure and method of assessing damages in DTPA cases.
37. Id. at 429; see Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981)(supreme court broadened the general interpretation of privity limitations on definition of
consumer); Gibbs, Elmquist, Jillson & Rector, Annual Survey of Texas Law, Consumer and
Creditor Rights, 36 Sw. L.J. 263, 278 (1982) (discussion of Cameron); see also Miranda v. Joe
Myers Ford, Inc., 638 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1982, no writ) (agent of
injured party cannot maintain suit under DTPA without authority); Basin Operating Co.,
Ltd. v. Valley Steel Prods. Co., 620 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (no requirement of privity of contract to recover damages under DTPA).
38. 636 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Id. at 821.
40. 634 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ); see supra note 6-9 and accom-
panying text.
41. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174-75 (Tex. 1980).
42. 634 S.W.2d at 75; see also First State Bank v. Chesshir, 634 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that holders of certificate of deposit were
not consumers who could bring action on certificate of deposit transactions under DTPA).
But see Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 388 (Tex. 1982)
(holding that extension of credit in installment sales contract simultaneously with purchase
of vehicle is service under DTPA).
43. 359 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1962) (defined services as "any act performed for the
benefit of another under some agreement").
44. 634 S.W.2d at 76-77.
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In Simmons v. Simpson45 the plaintiff asserted a cause of action for breach
of warranty in connection with the sale of a used automobile. Finding the
breach of warranty to be a producing cause of plaintiffs injury, the trial
court determined the cost of repairing the car to the condition it was repre-
sented to be in at the time of sale would have been $328.00. The difference
between the amount paid and its value at the time of sale was $75.00. The
trial court trebled the $328.00 cost of repair figure and awarded attorney's
fees and court costs to the plaintiff.46 Recognizing that the DTPA does not
extend the measure of damages beyond the well-settled common law
rules,47 the El Paso court of appeals found that since the plaintiff had
pleaded breach of warranty as the basis of her cause of action, the proper
measure of damages was the difference between the market value of what
was received and the value of what was contracted for.48
Damages for mental pain and anguish under the DTPA were the court's
concern in Ybarra v. Saldana.49 Three property owners filed suit under the
DTPA against a builder, and the trial court awarded treble their actual
damages of $11,098.74 plus attorney's fees and court costs. 50 The trial
court also found that the plaintiff suffered mental pain and anguish to the
extent of $6,000.00, but denied recovery of this sum. The San Antonio
court of appeals determined that the proper measure of damages was
treble the total loss the plaintiff sustained as a result of the deceptive trade
practice.51 Noting that actual damages have been defined to mean com-
mon law damages, the court upheld the trial court's award 'f treble the
excess of the reasonable and necessary cost of completion over the contract
price plus the reasonable value of plaintiffs services in supervising the
completion. 52 The court also affirmed the denial of damages for mental
pain and anguish. 53 In Rodriguez v. Holmstrom54 the Austin court of ap-
peals upheld a judgment trebling the estimated cost to repair a vehicle and
then subtracting the actual repair price.5 5 Finding actual damages suffi-
45. 626 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
46. Id. at 316.
47. Id.; see also American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1015 (DTPA does not extend measure of damages beyond the common law).
48. 626 S.W.2d at 317; see also Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 671 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.
1982) (denial of rehearing for reversal of award of damages confusing warranty damages
and strict liability damages); St. John v. Barker, 638 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo
1982, no writ) (damages are total loss sustained as result of deceptive trade practices).
49. 624 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
50. Actual damages consisted of $6,098.74 for reasonable and necessary expense in ex-
cess of the contract price needed to complete construction per the original plans, plus
$5,000.00 as the true value of appellee's services in supervising the construction work. Id. at
950.
51. Id. at 952.
52. Id. at 953; see also Smith v. Kinslow, 598 S.W.2d 910, 915-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1980, no writ) (limiting recovery to three times amount of actual damages).
53. 624 S.W.2d at 953.
54. 627 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App,-Austin 1981, no writ).
55. Id. at 201. The Texas Supreme Court, however, reduced actual damages in Smith
v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tex. 1980), by the applicable setoff prior to trebling. The
inconsistency is not addressed in Rodriguez. See Providence Hosp., Inc. v. Truly, 611
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ciently established, the court also upheld an award of attorney's fees.56
The defendant in Tom Benson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Alvarado57 appealed a
judgment awarding plaintiff prejudgment interest on an unliquidated
claim. The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount of
$2,155.96, representing double the time price differential charged by the
defendant,58 plus $23,115.00, which was treble the actual damages the
plaintiff suffered under the DTPA. The trial court also awarded prejudg-
ment interest from the date the cause of action arose plus attorney's fees.
The San Antonio court of appeals, citing Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v.
Union Construction Co. ,59 determined that when damages are conclusively
established as of a specific time and in a definite amount, interest is recov-
erable as a matter of right from the date of injury.60 The court therefore
amended the trial court judgment to permit prejudgment interest only on
the amount of damages "definitely determinable." '6'
D. Venue
The subject of proper venue in DTPA actions62 was the focus of several
courts during the survey period. In First Title Co. v. Cook 63 the Fort
Worth court of appeals determined that a plaintiff who: (1) had alleged to
be a consumer seeking services from the defendant; (2) had alleged that the
defendant's breach of warranty was a producing cause of action damages;
and (3) had proved that the defendant had done business in the county
where the action was filed, properly established venue.64 The court held
that to prove a cause of action under the venue statute,65 the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant breached the plaintiffs right and that some
part of the transaction creating the primary right occurred in the county
where the plaintiff brought the suit.66
S.W.2d 127, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ) (settlement amount deducted after
trebling of actual damages); Comment, Breach of Warranty and Treble Damages Under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 395 (1978).
56. 627 S.W.2d at 201.
57. 636 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see supra note
38-39 and accompanying text.
58. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.02(6) (Vernon Supp. 1981-1982).
59. 538 S.W.2d 80, 95-96 (Tex. 1976).
60. 636 S.W.2d at 824.
61. Id.
62. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides that an
action may be:
commenced in the county in which the person against whom the suit is
brought resides, has his principal place of business, or has a fixed and estab-
lished place of business at the time the suit is brought or in the county in
which the alleged act or practice occurred or in a county in which the defend-
ant or an authorized agent of the defendant ...solicited the transaction
made the subject of the action at bar.
63. 625 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ dism'd).
64. 1d. at 818-19.
65. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 23 (Vernon 1964).
66. 625 S.W.2d at 816-17; see also Allen Constr. Co. v. Parker Bros. & Co., 535 S.W.2d
751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ) (venue in suit against construction company
for breach of oral supply contract in county where contract made or breached); Inwood
19831
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The plaintiff in Balas v. First Bank 67 sued a contractor and a nonresi-
dent bank for removal of a cloud on the title of his residence. Sustaining
the bank's plea of privilege, the trial court transferred the cause to the
county of the bank's residence and principal place of business. The Hous-
ton [1st District] court of civil appeals, in affirming the trial court's ruling,
determined that at the time of the venue hearing the bank had disclaimed
all interest in the mechanic's lien contract and thus was not a necessary
party to the plaintiffs cause of action.68
E. Miscellaneous
Numerous other decisions were reported during the survey period that
interpreted other important aspects and ramifications of the DTPA. The
plaintiff in Termeer v. Interstate Motors, Inc.69 sued a partnership for vio-
lations of the DTPA. The trial court rendered a default judgment against
the partnership after the defendant partnership failed to answer. On ap-
peal by only one partner, the Beaumont court of appeals held that the
appealing partner was bound by his partner's actions that were found to be
in violation of the DTPA and affirmed the judgment. 70
The trial court in Mahoney v. Cupp7' ordered class certification and the
issuance of a temporary injunction enjoining the defendants from cancel-
ling or threatening to cancel any land sales contracts entered into with the
plaintiff and the other members of the class. On appeal the defendant
claimed that as a matter of law a DTPA suit cannot be maintained as a
class action, because in 1977 the Texas Legislature amended the DTPA to
repeal sections 17.51, 17.52, 17.53 and 17.54, which provided for class ac-
tions.72 Denying appellant's argument that such repeal evidenced a clear
legislative intent to preclude class actions under the DTPA, the Waco
court of appeals concluded that the better reasoning was that the legisla-
ture determined such special class action provisions were unnecessary in
light of the Texas Supreme Court's approval, on May 9, 1977, of rule 42 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 73
Through its Consumer Protection Division of the Office of Attorney
General, the State of Texas in Franklin v. State74 sued an individual car
dealer for violation of the DTPA. The state sought a permanent injunc-
tion and civil penalties for the alleged sale of automobiles without certifi-
cates of title. The actions complained of occurred prior to the 1979
Nat'l Bank v. First Bank & Trust, 485 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ)
(venue in suit between bank corporations in county where cause of action arose).
67. 623 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
68. Id. at 668.
69. 634 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982, no writ).
70. Id. at 14. The court reformed the judgment on other grounds. Id.
71. 638 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
72. Id. at 261; see 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, §§ 11-13, at 605.
73. 638 S.W.2d at 261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42 prescribes the procedure in Texas for com-
mencing a class action. See Pope & McConnico, Texas Civil Procedure Rule Making, 30
BAYLOR L. REV. 5, 14-15 (1978) (history of rule 42).
74. 631 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
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amendments to the DTPA, and therefore the case was examined on the
basis of whether the acts complained of were false, misleading, or decep-
tive under prior section 17.46. 75 Since violation of the Certificate of Title
Act 76 was not a laundry list violation, the El Paso court of appeals ruled
that the jury should first determine if the act occurred, and if so the court
should then determine if the act was a deceptive trade practice. 7 After the
jury found in the affirmative, the court held that the act of selling
automobiles without certificates of title was a deceptive trade practice.78
In McKnight v. Ideal Mutual Insurance Co .79 the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's actions of encouraging the plaintiff-insured to file a claim
and then denying coverage violated section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA8 0 and
various provisions of the Texas Insurance Code.8' In dismissing this por-
tion of plaintiff's complaint, a federal district court agreed with the defend-
ant that the Texas Insurance Code provisions the plaintiff relied upon do
not confer a private cause of action for the type of misconduct the plaintiff
aleged.8 2 Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that
section 17.50(a)(4)'s referral to article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code
conferred a private cause of action.8 3
Finally, in King v. Ladd8 4 the El Paso court of civil appeals reviewed a
trial court's award of treble damages and attorney's fees to a purchaser of
real estate. The sales contract provided that a swimming pool would be
completed by January 1, 1978. In June 1978 the buyer sued for $8,500.00
he alleged had to be expended to complete the pool. The buyer also filed
suit against an escrow agent for return of funds the purchaser had depos-
ited as part of the sales price. The suit was governed by the DTPA as it
existed after the 1977 amendments and prior to the 1979 amendments.
The operable portion of the DTPA at that time provided that no treble
damages could be awarded if the defendant proved he did not have rea-
sonable notice of the consumer's complaint before the suit was filed.8 5
Letters from the plaintiff's attorney to the escrow agent prior to the coin-
75. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, § 1, at 323.
76. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983).
77. 631 S.W.2d at 520; see Prairie Cattle Co. v. Fletcher, 610 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1980, writ dism'd).
78. 631 S.W.2d at 520.
79. 534 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
80. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). See supra
note 6 for the text of this provision.
81. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(a), (d), (e) (Vernon 1981).
82. 574 F. Supp. at 364.
83. Id.; see also Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 587 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (insured motorist not a consumer with private cause of
action against insurer under article 21.21); Alvarez v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 562 S.W.2d
263 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977), rev'don other grounds, 576 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1978)
(employee's widow has no private cause of action under article 21.21 against employer's
insurer). Cf. Humphreys v. Fort Worth Lloyds, 617 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1981, no writ) (summary judgment proceeding not proper forum to decide claim of failure to
state a course of action).
84. 624 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
85. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, § 6, at 604; see Lubbock Mortgage & Inv. Co. v.
Thomas, 626 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
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mencement of the suit demanding return of the escrowed funds were held
not to constitute adequate notice to trigger the right to treble damages.8 6
II. USURY
No Texas legislative changes occurred this year in the area of usury law,
although several cases of note were decided by the courts. Generally, the
judicial decisions refined usury principles already in place and did not
forge new ground for Texas lawyers.
Of particular importance to secured lenders was the decision in Starness
v. Guaranty Bank.87 In Starness the lender required its borrowers to
purchase a certificate of deposit and pledge the certificate as security for a
loan. The borrowers asserted that, in order to compute whether the lender
had charged usurious interest, the trial court should have reduced the prin-
cipal amount by the face amount of the certificate pledged. In rejecting the
borrower's argument, the Dallas court of appeals distinguished the instant
facts from those in First State Bank v. Miller,88 wherein the Texas Supreme
Court established that the test for usury should be applied to the net
amount of money the borrower has available for his use 89 notwithstanding
the failure to disburse the entire principal. In Miller the supreme court
determined the effective interest rate by reducing the face value of the note
by an amount required to be deposited in a nominal interest bearing ac-
count.90 In contrast, the borrower in Starness received the full principal of
the negotiated loan. Furthermore, the funds for the certificates ultimately
securing the obligation were not related to the loan. In holding that the
true principal of a loan, fully disbursed, is not reduced by the value of the
debtor's property pledged to secure the loan, regardless of the nature of the
pledged property, the Starness court confirmed an accepted principle of
law and avoided potential liability for lenders throughout Texas.9'
Two other cases decided in the past year affirmed long standing protec-
tions the usury laws have afforded creditors. First, the Houston [14th Dis-
86. 624 S.W.2d at 197. Whereas the previous version of the statute made notice a pre-
requisite to damages, the current version makes notice a prerequisite to suit. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). For other cases decided during the
survey period on the issue of collecting attorney's fees in a DTPA action or recovering attor-
ney's fees expended in defending a DTPA action brought in bad faith, see Computer Busi-
ness Serv., Inc. v. West, 627 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1981, writ retd n.r.e.); Long
v. Fox, 625 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ retd n.r.e.).
87. 634 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
88. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
89. Id. at 575.
90. Id. at 573.
91. 634 S.W.2d at 328; see Bradley v. Houston State Bank, 588 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ reed n.r.e.) (oan fully disbursed but compensating
balance required from borrowers' other funds); Loomis v. Blacklands Prod. Credit Ass'n,
579 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (stock of lender purchased
with part of loan proceeds and stock pledged to lender); Texas Int'l Mortgage Co. v. M.P.
Crum Co., 564 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (certificate of
deposit from third party purchased with part of loan proceeds and certificate pledged to
lender).
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trict] court of appeals in Arndt v. National Supply Co.92 affirmed the
general rule that usury is a defense personal to the obligor and a guaran-
tor's allegations of usury will not be heard.93 In Smart v. Crawford Build-
ing Material Co .94 the Tyler court of appeals adopted the corrollary to the
rule inArndt that the defense of usury is not assignable. 95 The assignment
of the usury claim in Smart arose out of a property settlement wherein the
wife received from her ex-husband an assignment of his usury claim
against a vendor. In exchange, the wife agreed to indemnify him for any
indebtedness to the vendor. Critical to the court's holding was its implied
finding that the wife's indemnification to her ex-husband did not alter or
change the husband's obligation to the vendor.96 Inasmuch as the wife did
not become liable to the vendor, she did not qualify as an obligor entitled
to assert the penalty provisions of article 5069-1.06. 97
During the survey period two cases addressed the elusive issue of what
constitutes "accidental and bona fide error" under Texas usury penalty
provisions.98 The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Tyra v. Bob
Carroll Construction Co.99 considered the issue of whether a mistaken
prayer for a usurious amount of interest in a petition can, given the cir-
cumstances, constitute accidental and bona fide error sufficient to spare the
creditor from the penalties in article 5069-1.06(1). 10 In holding that the
accidental and bona fide error defense is available, the supreme court
92. 633 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
93. Id. at 925.
94. 638 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
95. Id. at 230.
96. Also of critical importance to the trial court and the court of appeals was the finding
that the debt involved was not a community obligation of the Smarts but was only an obliga-
tion of Mr. Smart. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff sued both Smarts thereby indi-
cating its conclusion that Mrs. Smart was obligated, yet Mrs. Smart entered a general denial
and counterclaimed solely on the assignment of the usury cause of action from the property
settlement. Id.
97. Id. The applicable provision reads: "(1) Any person who contracts for, charges or
receives interest which is greater than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to
the obligor ...... TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1971-1982) (emphasis added).
98. The penalty provision provides:
(i) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is
greater than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor
three times the amount of usurious interest contracted for, charged or re-
ceived, such usurious interest being the amount the total interest contracted
for, charged, or received exceeds the amount of interest allowed by law, and
reasonable attorney fees fixed by the court except that in no event shall the
amount forfeited be less than Two Thousand Dollars or twenty percent of the
principal, whichever is the smaller sum; provided, that there shall be nopenaly
for any usurious interest which resultsfrom an accidental and bonafide error.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1982) (emphasis
added).
99. 639 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1982).
100. Although the court of civil appeals held that interest was not "charged" because the
petitioner amended its pleading to conform to the fact that it had not up to the time of
pleading charged interest, the supreme court assumed for the purposes of its opinion that
interest had been charged and such usurious charging by pleading was defensible as the
result of accidental and bona fide error. Id. at 691.
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adopted the rationale and interpretation espoused in PJM, Inc. v. Walter
Clark Advertising, Inc. 10 and by implication disapproved the appellate
court's dictum in Tyra that the bona fide error exception is inapplicable
whenever interest in excess of double the allowable amount has been
charged. 0 2 As reasoned by the Dallas court of appeals in PJM, the pen-
alty of forfeiture of principal 10 3 is in addition to and not independent of
the lesser penalty contained in subsection (1) of section 5069-1.06, and
the availability of the bona fide error exception is not precluded by the size
of the charge.'04 The San Antonio court of appeals came to a similar con-
clusion in Bendele v. Tri-County Farmer's Co-Op, 05 but as the Texas
Supreme Court stated on appeal of that case, the defense of accidental and
bona fide error must be pled for the lesser penalty in order to be similarly
pled against the more onerous provisions in article 5069-1.06(2). 0 6 In
addition to endorsing the applicability of bona fide error to subsection (2)
of section 5069-1.06, the court in PJM held that a clerical error resulting
in the charging of interest can be sufficient, given other circumstances in
the creditor's favor, to invoke the bona fide error defense. '0 7 In the course
of considering the issue, the court in PJM noted the penal nature of the
penalty under article 5069-1.06 and emphasized the need for courts to
construe the statute strictly before finding the penalty provisions
warranted. 0 8
Finally, two decisions during the survey period added to the already
substantial case authority for the principle that parties to an open account
can, by their course of conduct, agree to an interest rate higher than the
statutory maximum. In Preston Farm & Ranch Supply Inc. v. Bio-Zyme
Enterprises 10 9 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that parties to an open
account can, by course of conduct, evidence an agreement to pay a speci-
101. 624 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
102. 639 S.W.2d at 691; see Tyra v. Bob Carrol Constr. Co., 618 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1981).
103. The forfeiture of principal is authorized by subsection 2, which provides:
(2) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is in
excess of double the amount of interest allowed by this Subtitle shall forfeit as
an additional penalty, all principal as well as interest and all other charges and
shall pay reasonable attorney fees set by the court; provided further that any
such person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by fine of not more
than One Thousand Dollars. Each contract or transaction in violation of this
section shall constitute a separate offense punishable hereunder.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971).
104. 624 S.W.2d at 284-85.
105. 635 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Ct. App-San Antonio 1982), rev'd in part, afdin part, 641
S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1982). The court of appeals in Bendele noted agreement with the holding
in PJM that the penalty under paragraph two is excused in the absence of a paragraph one
penalty. 635 S.W,2d at 469.
106. 641 S.W.2d at 210.
107. 624 S.W.2d at 285.
108. Id.; see Agey v. American Liberty Pipe Line Co., 172 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. 1943); Hight
v. Jim Bass Ford, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. 625 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1981).
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fled and nonstatutorily imposed interest rate."10 Of significance was the
court's refusal to base its conclusion on section 2.207 of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code,"'I and its reliance instead upon the common law
principle of contracts implied in fact. 1 2 Further, the supreme court re-
jected the interpretation of the holding in Houston Sash & Door Co. v.
Heaner 13 as precluding a court from finding the existence of a contract
based upon invoices and course of dealing between the parties." 4  The
parties in Bio-Zyme engaged in at least twenty transactions, each evi-
denced by a monthly statement indicating a charge of interest, albeit exces-
sive. The court noted the obligor's acquiescence by payment of the interest
charges and his continued ordering of goods knowing the same interest
terms would apply, and concluded that an agreement to charge and pay
interest could be found from such action."15
The San Antonio court of appeals in Bendele faced an easier fact situa-
tion and concluded that an agreement to pay interest can be found from
the existence of invoices signed by the obligor.' 16 In so holding, the court
adopted the rule espoused in Dean Vivian Homes, Inc. v. Sebera's Plumbing
& Appliances, Inc. , 117 although it noted that prior to Dean Vivian Homes
110. Id. at 298. At the time the parties engaged in the transactions giving rise to the
dispute, the rate of interest legally chargeable on an open account was governed by the
version which read:
When no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties, interest at the
rate of six percent per annum shall be allowed on all written contracts ascer-
taining the sum payable, from and after the time when the sum is due and
payable; and on all open accounts, from the first day of January after the same
are made.
1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 2, at 609, repealed by 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 707, § I, at
1718.
111. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
(a) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms.
(b) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(1) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(2) they materially alter it; or
(3) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a
reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(c) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, to-
gether with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions
of this title.
112. 625 S.W.2d at 299-300.
113. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979); see Bendele v. Tri-County Farmer's Co-op, 635 S.W.2d
459 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 641 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1982).
114. 625 S.W.2d at 300.
115. Id. at 298.
116. 635 S.W. at 466.
117. 615 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
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little authority existed for such a conclusion." 18 Thus, in the wake of Bio-
Zyme and Bendele, substantial authority is developing to enable the courts
to find a meeting of the minds to pay interest even absent a formal signed
document.
III. CONSUMER CREDIT
In the area of consumer credit, recent cases primarily restated or refined
firmly entrenched legal principles. The one exception to that statement
effectively ended the availability of one cause of action for consumers.
During the survey period the Texas Supreme Court considered in Knight
v. International Harvester Credit Corp. 119 whether the absence of a savings
clause provision in the statute repealing chapter 14120 of the credit code
precluded the survivability of a pending cause of action alleging chapter 14
violations.' 2' Despite the consumer's argument that the Code Construc-
tion Act' 22 preserved the cause of action, the court concluded that absent a
savings clause in the repealing statute, the right of recovery based on chap-
ter 14 was extinguished. 123 In rejecting Knight's argument, the court noted
that the Code Construction Act was enacted to aid in the construction of
codes in the state's continuing statutory revision program and that chapter
14 was not enacted pursuant to that program. 124
In Ciminelli v. Ford Motor Credit Co. 125 the Texas Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a co-signor of a conditional sales contract is, for purposes
of chapter 7, an obligor entitled to allege violations of that chapter.
Ciminelli had agreed to assist an employee in the purchase of an automo-
bile by signing the conditional sales contract as co-buyer. Although the
contract in question contained a section for a guarantor's signature,
Ciminelli did not sign in that section nor did he intend to act as a guaran-
tor of his employee's debt. Noting that Ciminelli had all the obligations of
an obligor under the contract, the supreme court concluded that his pri-
118. 635 S.W.2d at 466.
119. 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982).
120. Act of Aug. 27, 1979, ch. 672, § 51, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1595. Chapter 14 of the
credit code was designed to require, as a matter of state law, disclosures nearly identical to
the disclosures already required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act. See Act of Dec. 31,
1975, ch. 184, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 421.
121. Knight argued that International Harvester violated subsections 14.04 and 14.17.
Subsection 14.04 provided: "(b) Charges or premiums for credit-life, accident, or health
insurance written in connection with any consumer-credit transaction shall be included in
the finance charge .... Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5069-14.04 (1975) (repealed 1979).
Subsection 14.17 provided: "(a) In connection with each consumer-credit sale not under an
open-end credit plan, the creditor shall disclose each of the following items which is applica-
ble." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 5069-14.17 (1975) (repealed 1979).
122. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
123. 627 S.W.2d at 385.
124. Id.; see National Carloading Corp. v. Phoenix-El Paso Express, Inc., 176 S.W.2d
564 (Tex. 1943); Dickson v. Navarro County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 3, 139 S.W.2d
257 (Tex. 1940); Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Gibbens, 608 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
125. 624 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1981).
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mary liability enabled him to assert against Ford any violations of chapter
7.126 The court commented that the decision of the Amarillo court of ap-
peals in Hensley v. Lubbock National Bank 127 does not stand for the prop-
osition that a co-buyer cannot be a retail buyer, and therefore an obligor,
under chapter 7; rather, Hensley merely restricts from the class of retail
buyers those persons who buy motor vehicles principally for the purpose of
resale.128
The decisions of Vela v. Ebert's Mobile Homes, Inc. 29 and Rick Furni-
ture Distributing Co. v. Kirlin 130 added to substantial case law demonstrat-
ing the severe consequences of violating the consumer credit code. In Vela
the seller transformed a conditional sales contract to purchase a mobile
home into a lease due to the purchaser's inability to raise a sufficient down
payment. The terms of the lease were nearly identical to the terms of the
original sales contract, and the lessee had the option to become the owner
of the mobile home for no additional consideration. The lease's lack of a
conforming notice'31 and its obvious character as a conditional sales con-
tract caused the Corpus Christi court of appeals to find a chapter 6 viola-
tion; thus the court subjected the seller-lessor to the penalties imposed
under chapter 8.132
In Rick the Dallas court of appeals concluded that the creditor's peti-
tion, which prayed for recovery of unearned time-price differential, consti-
tuted a charging under articles 5069-8.01 and 5069-8.02 and that
amendments to the petition did not absolve the creditor from the conse-
quences of having violated chapter 8.133 The severe rule imposed by Rick,
however, may be tempered by the arguably conflicting decision of the El
Paso court of appeals in Tyra v. Bob Carroll Construction Co. 134 The court
in Rick also upheld the constitutionality of the chapter 8 penalty provi-
sions,' 35 which were challenged as imposing an excessive fine or penalty
126. Id. at 906.
127. 561 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
128. 624 S.W.2d at 905-06.
129. 630 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. 634 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
131. The notice that should have been included in the contract/lease states:
NOTICE TO THE BUYER. DO NOT SIGN THIS CONTRACT BEFORE
YOU READ IT OR IF IT CONTAINS BLANK SPACES. YOU ARE EN-
TITLED TO A COPY OF THE CONTRACT YOU SIGN. UNDER THE
LAW YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO PAY OFF IN ADVANCE THE FULL
AMOUNT DUE AND UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS MAY OBTAIN
A PARTIAL REFUND OF THE TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL. KEEP
THIS CONTRACT TO PROTECT YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS.
This notice is required by TEX. REV. Civ. STA'r. ANN. art. 5069--6.02(2) (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1971-1982).
132. 630 S.W.2d at 438.
133. 634 S.W.2d at 740.
134. 618 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981), aft'd, 639 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1982).
In Tyra the plaintiff sought the amount owed on an account plus interest of one and one-
half percent. The court of appeals held that this did not constitute a usurious charging
under chapter 8. 618 S.W.2d at 856.
135. 634 S.W.2d at 741-42; see also St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63
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and as denying due process of law. 136 Drawing on the decision of the
Texas Supreme Court in Pennington v. Singleton, 137 the court noted that a
fine "is not unconstitutionally excessive and the court will not overrule the
legislature's discretion, 'except in extraordinary cases, where it becomes so
manifestly violative of the constitutional inhibition as to shock the sense of
mankind,'" and that a fine constitutes a denial of due process only if its
severity is wholly disproportionate to the offense and clearly
unreasonable. ' 38
In Charlie Hillard, Inc. v. Heath 139 the Forth Worth court of appeals
approved a contract provision that granted the seller the "free right of en-
try" to effect a repossession.' 40 The buyer argued that the contract provi-
sion constituted an attempt to subvert article 5069-7.07(3)'s prohibition of
nonpeaceful repossessions.' 41 The court rejected this argument and found
that the provision merely restated the seller's rights to repossess its collat-
eral peacefully and did not purport to grant the seller any rights contrary
to law.' 42 Another contract provision, which entitled the seller to retain
personalty found in the repossessed car after passage of a twenty-four-hour
grace period for the debtor to replevy, 43 was found to violate article
5069-7.07(4).1 The court reached this conclusion because the provision
constituted a contractual waiver of the buyer's legal rights against the
seller.145 The court's decision with respect to subsection 4 is consistent
(1919); Anguiano v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
136. 634 S.W.2d at 741.
137. 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
138. 634 S.W.2d at 741 (citing Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 690).
139. 624 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
140. Id. at 760.
141. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1982) states:
"No retail installment contract or retail charge agreement shall: (3) Authorize the seller or
holder or other person acting on his behalf to enter upon the buyer's premises unlawfully or
to commit any breach of the peace in repossession of a motor vehicle."
142. 624 S.W.2d at 760; see Dub Shaw Ford, Inc. v. Jackson, 622 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Ct.
App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ); Woolard v. Texas Motors Inc., 616 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ); see also Tradewinds Ford Sales, Inc. v. Caskey, rev'd in
part on other grounds, aff'd in part, and remanded, 616 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1981).
143. The contract provided:
[Imn the event Buyer defaults in any payment . . .Seller shall have the rights
and remedies of a Secured Party under the Uniform Commercial Code, in-
cluding the right to repossess the Property whenever the same may be found
with free right of entry ..... Any personalty in or attached to the property
when repossessed may be held by Seller without liability and Buyer shall be
deemed to have waived any claim thereto unless written demand by certified
mail is made upon Seller within 24 hours after repossession."
624 S.W.2d at 760.
144. Subsection 4 states that no contract shall: "Provide for a waiver of the buyer's rights
of action against the seller or holder or other person acting therefor for any illegal act com-
mitted in the collection of payments under the contract or agreement or in the repossession
of a motor vehicle." TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(4) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
197 1-1982).
145. 624 S.W.2d at 761.
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with earlier decisions on this issue.146
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
A. Garnishment
In Commercial Mortgage Insurance, Inc. v. Citizens National Bank 47 a
federal district court considered whether the Employment Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) 48 bars a plan beneficiary's commercial credi-
tor from garnishing benefits. The court found that those provisions of
ERISA 149 and the Internal Revenue Code' 50 that prohibit the assignment
or alienation of pension benefits create a general federal exemption of pen-
sion benefits from commercial creditors' claims and that these provisions
preempt otherwise relevant state law.' 5'
The Corpus Christi court of appeals examined the rights of an interven-
ing creditor who claimed a lien on a garnished deposit account in Bullock
v. Foster Cathead Co.' 52 A judgment creditor attempted to garnish a de-
posit account that the judgment debtor had previously assigned to the
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts as security for the issuance of a
limited sales and use tax permit. The assignment stated that it was meant
as security for tax liabilities "which may accrue."' 153 The appellate court
found that this assignment met the requirements of a common law pledge,
even though the debtor owed no debt to the assignee at the time of the
assignment or at the time of trial. 154 The court also found that the assignee
had constructive possession of the pledged property by virtue of a recita-
tion in the assignment that the account was to be held "for the sole use and
subject to the exclusive control of the Comptroller" and by virtue of the
fact that the garnishee had notice of the pledge. 155
The garnishing creditor fared no better in Appeal Contractors, Inc. v..
Vantage Properties, Inc. , 56 in which the Dallas court of appeals held that
a party claiming a security interest in a deposit account is entitled to inter-
vene in the garnishment action in order to establish its claimed lien on the
garnished funds. 157 The trial court dismissed the intervention because it
unnecessarily complicated the garnishment action, but ruled that the dis-
missal was without prejudice to the intervenor's right to pursue its claim to
146. See Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1981), and cases cited
therein.
147. 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
149. Id. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
150. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
151. 526 F. Supp. at 516.
152. 631 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
153. Id. at 210.
154. Id. The court's ruling on this point was probably incorrect in light of First Nat'l
Bank v. McCamey, 105 S.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937), which held that an
existing debt or obligation is a prerequisite to a valid pledge.
155. 631 S.W.2d at 210.
156. 620 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
157. Id. at 667.
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the funds in an independent action against the garnishor. The appellate
court found that the intervenor's rights would necessarily be prejudiced if
it were not allowed to establish its secured claim in the original garnish-
ment action, because the intervenor may not have an independent right of
action against the garnishor once the funds in the garnished account were
released to the garnishor.'58
In Commercial Credit Corp. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 159 the
Houston [Ist District] court of appeals considered whether a party may
garnish a judgment debt when the judgment is not final. The court held
that until a judgment is final no property interest exists that is subject to
garnishment; thus, a garnishment action filed before a judgment is final is
a nullity.160
B. Postjudgment Discovery
The Texas Supreme Court discussed inArndt v. Farris 161 the procedures
required by rule 621 a to "initiate and maintain" discovery proceedings.1 62
The case came before the court on an original mandamus petition wherein
the relator sought an order compelling the trial court to vacate its order
imposing sanctions for the relator's failure to appear at a postjudgment
deposition. The relator had appealed the judgment under which postjudg-
ment discovery was sought, but had not filed a supersedeas bond. The
relator contended that postjudgment discovery can only be initiated by
filing an original petition and by serving a new citation on the judgment
debtor. In the absence of such a procedure, the relator argued that the trial
court was without jurisdiction to issue any orders relating to postjudgment
discovery. The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled
that postjudgment discovery under rule 621a can be initiated and main-
tained in the same cause in which the judgment was entered, pursuant to
the rules governing pretrial discovery. 63
Kantor v. Herald Publishing Co.164 dealt with another unusual attack on
postjudgment discovery procedures. The judgment creditor, Herald Pub-
lishing Co., was pursuing postjudgment discovery on a default judgment
against Kantor. While the postjudgment discovery was pending, Kantor
filed a bill of review that the trial court denied. He also filed a supersedeas
bond on the default judgment. Kantor then appealed the denial of the bill
of review and moved the appellate court for leave to file a petition for writ
of prohibition forbidding the trial court from continuing to exercise juris-
diction over postjudgment discovery in the case in which the default judg-
ment was entered. Kantor contended that the supersedeas bond abated
postjudgment discovery until such time as a final judgment was entered in
158. Id.
159. 630 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
160. Id. at 652.
161. 633 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1982).
162. TEX. R. Civ. P. 621a.
163. 633 S.W.2d at 499.
164. 632 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
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the bill of review action. The Tyler court of appeals rejected this argument
because it found that the default judgment was final. Thus, the superse-
deas bond was ineffective to suspend either execution or postjudgment dis-
covery on the default judgment. 165
V. EXEMPT PROPERTY
4. Homestead Exemption
Continuing the tradition of liberally interpreting the Texas exemption
statutes, the Texas Supreme Court in Renaldo v. Bank of San Antonio 166
held that a divorced parent can dedicate his separate property as a family
homestead even though it was never occupied as a family homestead dur-
ing marriage. 167 The court noted that a parent's right to a family home-
stead "derives from the relationship to his or her children"; thus, it is
unnecessary for the divorced parent to establish his homestead right prior
to divorce. 168
The Corpus Christi court of appeals in Clark v. Salinas'69 also liberally
construed the nature of proof required to establish that property is being
held as a homestead in the absence of actual occupancy. The proof the
homestead claimant offered was that he had purchased certain building
materials and construction plans that had not been put to any use at the
time of trial. The appellant argued that a trial court may only consider as
evidence of the requisite intent those activities performed on the home-
stead property itself. The appellate court rejected this evidentiary limita-
tion and held that the purchase of building materials and construction
plans were sufficient evidence of intent to occupy the land as a homestead
even though the materials had been purchased at least two years before the
homestead claim was disputed. 170
B. Personal Property Exemptions
In In re Howerton 171 a federal bankruptcy court considered whether the
benefits from an individual retirement annuity contract established pursu-
ant to the Internal Revenue Code 172 are exempt property under Texas law.
The debtors argued that, under the terms of their annuity contract and the
IRC provisions, their interest in the annuities was not transferable and that
this transfer prohibition meant that the annuities were exempt under Texas
law. As authority for this argument the debtors cited Moser v. Tucker, 173
which contains the rather general statement that no "interest in property is
165. Id. at 658.
166. 630 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1982).
167. Id. at 640.
168. Id.
169. 626 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981), writ refdn.r.e. per curiam,
628 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1982).
170. 626 S.W.2d at 120.
171. 21 Bankr. 621 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
172. 26 U.S.C. § 408(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
173. 87 Tex. 94, 26 S.W. 1044 (1895).
19831
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
subject to sale under execution or like process, unless the debtor . . . has
power to pass title to such property or interest in property by his own
act." ' 74 The bankruptcy court found that the broad legal principle stated
in Moser v. Tucker applied only to the nonassignability of remote and con-
tingent property interests and not to annuities from which the debtors
could so easily withdraw their cash value. 75
The debtor in England v. First National Bank 176 argued that heavy ma-
chinery used in his business was exempt as "tools of the trade" under the
Texas personal property exemption statute. 177 The federal bankruptcy
court initially noted that two lines of authority have developed in Texas on
the breadth of the exemption permitted for tools of the trade: One line of
authority limits the exemption to tools used by hand, 178 and a more liberal
view allows an exemption for all tools of the trade, regardless of their size
or the power source for their use. 179 The bankruptcy court reasoned that
the liberal view was more consistent with the current $30,000 limitation for
personal property exemptions and held that heavy machinery may be ex-
empted under Texas law.' 80
VI. CREDITORS' RIGHTS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. Bankruptcy Courts' Jurisdiction
In Northern Ppeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 18l the
Supreme Court invalidated at least a portion of section 241(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978.182 In a plurality opinion Justice Brennan con-
cluded that section 241(a) of the Code "has impermissibly removed most,
174. Id. at 96, 26 S.W. at 1045.
175. 21 Bankr. at 623.
176. 22 Bankr. 389 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
177. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
178. See Willis v. Morris, 66 Tex. 628, 1 S.W. 799 (1886); see also In re McFrancis, 22 F.
Supp. 581 (S.D. Tex. 1938); In re Turrentine & Thompson, 6 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Tex. 1934);
McMillan v. Dean, 174 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1943, writ ref d w.o.m.); Mc-
Gehee v. Smith, 163 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, no writ); Thresher v.
McEvoy, 193 S.W. 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1917, writ dism'd); Comer v. Powell, 189
S.W. 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916, no writ).
179. See Meritz v. Palmer, 266 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1959); Green v. Raymond, 58 Tex. 80
(1882); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Patterson, 248 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Moore v. Neyland, 180 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1944, no writ); Huebsch Mfg. Co. v. Coleman, 113 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1938, no writ); Lopez v. Naegelin, 59 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1933, no writ);
Hickley-Tandy Leather Co. v. Hazelwood, 35 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931,
no writ); Harris v. Tonley, 161 S.W. 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1913, no writ); St. Louis
Type Foundry v. Taylor, 35 S.W. 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
180. 22 Bankr. at 392. The court also held that a nonpossessory, non-purchase-money
security interest in the machinery could be avoided under II U.S.C. § 522(0 (1976). 22
Bankr. at 391-92. This ruling is questionable in light of the provision in art. 3836(a) that
excepts from the exemption statute property subject to encumbrances, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 3836(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), the recent Fifth Circuit case of McManus v.
Avco Fin. Servs., 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982), and In re Evans, 25 Bankr. 105 (N.D. Tex.
1982).
181. 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1982).
182. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the Art. III
district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct."' 83
Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice O'Connor,
stated that the precise jurisdictional issue before the Court was whether
Marathon Pipeline Company could be forced to defend, in the bankruptcy
court and over its objection, an action for breach of contract filed by a
debtor in bankruptcy. 84 Justice Rehnquist concurred with the plurality
because he agreed that the portion of the jurisdictional grant in section
214(a), which he found to be unconstitutional, was not readily severable
from the remaining jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts under
section 241(a).18 5
Although Congress had an opportunity to enact remedial legislation in
response to Marathon, it failed to do so, and the Court's judgment became
effective on December 24, 1982.186 In response to the jurisdictional void
left by Marathon,187 the judicial councils in each federal circuit entered
orders directing the district courts in their respective circuits to adopt, by
December 25, 1982, certain emergency rules drafted by the Administrative
Office for the United States Courts and to provide for the administration
of bankruptcy cases and proceedings. 8 8 These emergency rules provide
that "all cases under Title 11 and all civil proceedings arising under Title
11 or arising in or related to cases under Title 11 are to be referred to the
bankruptcy judges of this district."'189
The emergency rules under which bankruptcy cases are presently being
administered are also subject to constitutional attack.' 90 Thus, the Mara-
thon jurisdictional quagmire will probably continue to impede the admin-
istration of bankruptcy cases and the bankruptcy courts' resolution of
controversies until Congress enacts legislation curing the constitutional de-
fects. 191 From the standpoint of creditors' rights, this jurisdictional uncer-
183. 102 S. Ct. at 2879-80, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 625. Section 241a of the Code amended title
28 of the United States Code by addino a new chapter 90 that conferred jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy courts in "all civil proceedings arising under title II or arising in or related to
cases under title 1 ." 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This section includes provi-
sions pertaining to venue in bankruptcy cases, id. §§ 1472, 1473, 1475; the removal and
remand of cases in bankruptcy, id. § 1478; jury trials in bankruptcy cases, id. § 1480; and the
general judicial powers of the bankruptcy courts, id. § 1481.
184. 102 S. Ct. at 2881, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 626. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 2882, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 627.
186. The Court's judgment in Marathon was originally stayed until Oct. 4, 1982. Id. at
2880, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 626. On that date the stay was extended until Dec. 24, 1982, pursuant
to a Motion to Extend Stay filed by the Solicitor General of the United States.
187. For a detailed discussion of the impact of Marathon on the administration of bank-
ruptcy cases, see Bankruptcy Court Act of 1982: Hearings on HA 6109 Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 60-73 (1982) (hereinafter Subcommittee Report) (Statement of the National Bankruptcy
Conference) and id. at 87-93 (statement of the Honorable Dean M. Gandy).
188. See W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3-7 (Pamph. Supp. 1983).
189. Id. at 4.
190. See, e.g., Winters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Schear Group, 25 Bankr. 463 (S.D.
Ohio 1982).
191. There is a consensus among bankruptcy practitioners, commentators, and judges
that Congress should respond to Marathon by granting to the bankruptcy courts all of the
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tainty will undoubtedly mean increased delays and increased costs in
pursuing and obtaining commercial remedies in the bankruptcy courts.
B. Avoidance of Liens on Consumer Goods
The issue raised on appeal to the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Security Industrial Bank 192 was whether the retroactive applica-
tion of the Code's lien avoidance provision 93 violates the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The provision allows a debtor to avoid
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in certain types of
exempt property if the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is
otherwise entitled under the Code. 194 The Supreme Court avoided the
constitutional issue by finding that Congress did not intend section 522(f)
to be applied retroactively. 9 Thus, section 522(f) may now only be ap-
plied to security interests that were created by conveyances after October
1, 1979.
The Supreme Court's validation of the lien avoidance provision in Se-
curity Industrial Bank will probably not benefit Texas debtors who attempt
to avoid liens that impair exemptions claimed under Texas law in light of
the Texas personal property exemption statute 96 and the Fifth Circuit's
recent decision in McManus v. Avco Financial Services. 197 The issue in
McManus was whether a party claiming exemptions under Louisiana law
could avoid a nonpossessory security interest pursuant to section 522().
Louisiana law precludes exemptions for property on which the debtor has
previously granted a chattel mortgage. 98 The debtor argued that the
granting of a chattel mortgage against his household goods was merely a
waiver of his exemptions, and since section 522(f) is, by its terms, applica-
ble "notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions," he was still entitled to
avoid the subject lien. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with this construction
of section 522(f) and held that the debtor could not avoid chattel
mortgage. ' 99
A federal bankruptcy court recently applied the McManus rationale in
In re Evans .20 The bankruptcy court considered whether a Texas debtor
could invoke section 522(f) to avoid a security interest that encumbered
property the debtor claimed to be exempt under the Texas personal prop-
erty exemption statute.201 The court noted that the Texas statute contains a
provision similar to the Louisiana statute analyzed in McManus in that it
attributes of article III courts. See, e.g., Subcommittee Report, supra note 187, at 87-93, 189-
207.
192. 103 S. Ct. 407, 74 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1982).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 552(0(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
194. Id.
195. 103 S. Ct. at 414, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 245.
196. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
197. 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).
198. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3885 (West 1982).
199. 681 F.2d at 357.
200. 25 Bankr. 105 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
201. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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does not permit a debtor to claim an exemption as to encumbered personal
property against the person who holds the lien or encumbrance. 20 2 Given
the similarity, the court concluded that the McManus holding was control-
ling and held that a person claiming exemptions under Texas law cannot
utilize section 522(o to avoid encumbrances. 203
C. Collateral Estoppel
Several state court cases considered whether the collateral estoppel doc-
trine is applicable in actions involving issues similar to those decided in
prior bankruptcy cases. In Adams v. Wilhite2°4 the Texas Supreme Court
considered whether a bankruptcy court's prior ruling that a debtor did not
intend to defraud his creditor constituted collateral estoppel in a subse-
quent state court action brought by the bankruptcy trustee under the Texas
fraudulent conveyance laws.205 In the bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee
had objected to the debtor's discharge pursuant to section 727(a)(2). 206
The supreme court held that the determination in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing that the debtor did not intend to defraud his creditors when he con-
veyed his business property to his wife, collaterally estopped the
bankruptcy trustee from raising the issue in a subsequent suit to set aside
the transfer of the property.20 7
In Edmundson Investment Co. v. Florida Treco Co.208 a creditor sued for
a deficiency judgment following a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a
deed of trust. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was judicially es-
topped from claiming a deficiency because he had stipulated in the
debtor's prior bankruptcy proceeding that the value of the property in
question exceeded the amount of indebtedness. The Houston [14th Dis-
trict] court of appeals found that the bankruptcy court had made no
specific finding of fact on the value of the property.20 9 The court therefore
ruled that the plaintiff was not bound by the prior stipulation, particularly
since it was made in connection with a settlement agreement that the
debtor subsequently breached and that had been made two years before
the foreclosure sale. 210
202. Article 3836(a) provides in part: "Personal property ... is exempt from attach-
ment, execution and every type of seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities, except for encum-
brances properly fixed thereon." Id. (emphasis added).
203. 25 Bankr. at 110. Since the State of Texas has not yet exercised its option to pre-
clude the use of the federal exemptions provided under § 522(d), see II U.S.C. § 522(b)
(Supp. V 1981), the avoidance of liens under § 522(f) is still available to Texas debtors who
claim exemptions under § 522(d).
204. 640 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. 1982).
205. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN., §§ 24.01-05 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1982-1983).
206. I1 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1982) provides: (a) The court shall grant the
debtor a discharge, unless (2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor
...has transferred ...(A) property of the debtor, within one year of the filing of the
petition."
207. 640 S.W.2d at 877.
208. 633 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), writ refdper curiam,
640 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1982).
209. 633 S.W.2d at 603.
210. Id.
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Another collateral estoppel issue arose in Rohdie v. Washington,211 in
which a general partner of a limited partnership was sued on a debt that
the partnership had incurred while it was a debtor in bankruptcy. The
general partner argued that the plaintiff was asserting the same claim in
the present action that the bankruptcy court had denied when the plaintiff
had attempted to collect the debt from the bankruptcy trustee. The El
Paso court of appeals rejected the argument and held that res judicata was
not applicable because the general partner was not a party to, and did not
participate in, the bankruptcy court case.2 12
211. 641 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
212. Id. at 320. The stated rationale for the court's ruling on the res judicata defense is
questionable in light of such cases as Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1977). In
Hammonds the Texas Supreme Court held that res judicata is applicable in an action in
which the parties or their privies are the same as in the prior action. Id. at 346.
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